"So small is the prudence of men that they sometimes undertake to defend others when they neither know how, nor are able, to defend themselves". 1 The liberal international agenda promoted by the European Union is in crisis. At a time when America through a sparkling and spirited election campaign is rediscovering the merits of multilateralism, engagement and diplomacy 2 , Europe, for its part, is slowly and painfully acknowledging that its ethical and moral foreign policies have reached their limits. Clearly, a liberal international agenda is filled with strategic dilemma, political frustrations and less than ideal results. None the less, the current European crisis runs deeper than the ordinary and familiar vices of international liberalism. As developed below, Europe has a problem of mindset, commitment and capabilities. This paper will review these problems with a special emphasis on military developments, i.e. the ESDP side of current EU external actions.
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The third geopolitical shift was even more dramatic for Europe. For the United States, the 9/11 attacks changed the world, for Europe, they transformed America. The answer of the Bush administration to this new "day of infamy" displayed some permanent trends as well as some specific new features of US foreign policy. Among the former, several old habits can easily be identified: a Manichean approach to the definition of the enemy, a global interpretation of the threat, an ideological perspective in framing the challenge, a missionary zeal in fulfilling its new-found mission -with the usual premium on power, technology and warfare as solutions to the new security dilemmas raised by international terrorism. Among the latter, several innovations stand out: a sovereign prerogative to proclaim right and wrong for the world, a clear emphasis on pre-emption that turned into prevention in the case of Iraq, and an evident choice for a unilateral approach to achieve US objectives. All these elements derived from the simultaneous combination of absolute confidence in US supremacy in the world and its sudden vulnerability. But for Europe, the US reaction to 9/11 had severe consequences.
Europe ceased to be of significant strategic interests for the US. The fundamental issue behind the transatlantic partnership was not anymore the degree and extent of American involvement in European security: the question shifted to a debate about the place and role of Europe in an American strategy for global security. With the war in Iraq, EU Member States answered this question very differently: some opted for the counterbalanced some preferred the bandwagon, others remained hidden. In search for influence, all ultimately were unsuccessful. Moreover, when strategic interests differ, institutions collapsed: For the status quo powers, divergent security interests raised the entrapment dilemma whereby they could be asked to participate in a war that they did not want. For the revisionist actor, it was the opposite, the chain-gang dilemma, whereby allies were seen as slowing factors and obstacles to its autonomy and objectives. In these circumstances, NATO went though a near-death experience; the EU was deeply divided and rapidly irrelevant. 15 At the same time, European officials were conscious of the destructive impact of Europe's divisions and bureaucrats started to draft a document that will become a security strategy paper endorsed by Europeans in December 2003. 15 On these dilemma, see T. J. Christensen and J. Snyder., "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity", International Organization, vol. 44, no. 2, 1990, pp. 137-68. As P.
Schroeder noted at the time, "The US administration's stand on Iraq flatly contravenes that basic requirement for a durable alliance. If this persists, it will not necessarily mean the formal end of NATO, but it will mean its hollowing out, as America's partners search for other combinations to defend their interests and find refuge from the likely consequences of America's actions and as America's opponents are encouraged to seek partners and form coalitions against it". Schroeder Paul W., "Iraq: The Case Against Preemptive War", The American Conservative, October 21 2002.
The European Security Strategy was thus a clear reminder to member States that disunity has a strategic cost, that challenges around the world had to be addressed in a united manner, and that Europe's influence ultimately rests on its capacity to get its act together. Drawing a security concept faced difficult dilemmas: to reach a broad consensus while acknowledging the significant different strategic traditions and culture among member States, to map strategic threats while recognizing that they affect member States differently, to outline an overall approach in addressing them while taking into account the Union's particular acquis and identity. Inevitably, the document was thus more about a vision than about strategic interests, more about attitude than policies. 16 If it was never intended to be a guidebook for specific foreign policy initiatives, it presented however a genuine European worldview and approach to world affairs. One may be entitled to describe this philosophy of International Affairs as a specific European liberal internationalism. The EU, by identity rather than practice, presents itself to the world as a unique and successful civilian and ethical actor, articulating a prudent liberal vision to promote democracy and the rule of law, to defend and protect human rights and to support peaceful resolution of conflicts. Based on diplomacy rather than force, on incremental change rather than big bangs, Europe's liberalism presupposes a global reach posture and an interventionist mindset. 17 Both elements are currently highly questionable in the Union which is still trying to solve its Constitutional crisis that inflicts many deep wounds and leaves few credible leaders. The inward-looking tendency remains a serious obstacle to a truly "global" and effectively "moral" Europe. Ethics are not only a subject of discourses, they are most importantly a matter of effective actions.
Despite all its deficiencies, and some will argue its urgent need for an update, -a clear objective of the forthcoming French presidency-, the Solana Paper remains an inspiration for the myriad of actors involved in Europe Foreign and Security policies.
From the document, European liberal internationalism is based on two pillars: preventive engagement and effective multilateralism. Prevention refers to the Union's approach to crisis-management and nation-building which includes non only traditional military peacekeepers but also police personnel, civil administration officials and justice officers 16 On the document, see among others, Alyson Bailes, "The European Security Strategy", SIPRI Policy In Georgia, the focus was on the criminal justice system, an area deemed critical to strengthen the "Rose revolution" on the short term and to build a secure public security environment on the long term, with mixed successes however. 40 Overall, these missions were useful, but they serve interests before values. Beyond its neighbourhood, the liberal agenda is often minimal and short-termed. In one of its most important missions, the EUFOR in Congo in July 2006, the Union commitment was more symbolic than real, avoiding to deploy troops where troubles were likely to arise, i.e. in the East of the country, limiting the actual deployment to Kinshasa and starting the operation barely a day before the actual voting. As the Human Right Watch noted, "… often the European Union will accept an electoral facade so long as the 'victor' is a strategic or commercial ally. The fairness of the vote and the openness of campaign conditions seem to matter 37 As Ph. Bobbitt puts it, this has blurred the traditional division between the foreign, -the realm of strategy-and the domestic, -the realm of law. an Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights with a € 1 billion for the next 6 years, the European liberal internationalism is far more Westphalian than the post-modern terminology would admit.
A second feature of European liberal internationalism is the Union strong belief in international institutions. This is of course linked to its preference to multilateralism in world politics. Being a reasonably successful institution itself, -if we put aside recurrent crises of legitimacy that Brussels is facing 42 -, it wants to export its success abroad. Yet, it is largely doubtful whether other regions of the world could emulate the European experience. 43 This strong belief in institutions faces however serious conceptual problems and could be self-defeating. Two issues must be differentiated, the strategic and the humanitarian one. At the strategic level, the nature of contemporary threats is not conducive for an enhanced role of security institutions. Terrorism is a global phenomena and it demands coordinate answers at the international level. But this coordination is largely relevant for protection and preparedness rather than prevention and pursuit.
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The Union itself has a marginal role in the later two aspects of counter-terrorism, for these, States are mainly in charge. Against this radicalization, every country develops its own counter-terrorism policies, depending on its national modus vivendi between immigration, security structures and cultures, past experiences and constitutional rights.
There are more differences than commonalities between the French and the British ways of tackling extremism. There are even more divergences in framing and responding to this global threat between Europe and the United States. 45 Terrorism is a matter of national security rather than institutions. At the level of humanitarian intervention and collective security, the added value of security institutions is also in doubt. Of course, demand a high level of cooperation: a common framing and understanding of the crisis at hand, a similar approach to solve it, an equal acceptance of the risks involved. At the tactical level, they imply a common strategy, a clear chain of command, flexible yet interoperable forces. In these conditions, unilateralism is far more common than its opposite.
In the history of humanitarian intervention, it is not surprising that the most successful 46 Debates about international institutions have animated the field of IR for decades. is a complex conflict, -as it is often the case-, then the kinetic dimension of this force will rapidly take precedence. It will be a "war amongst the people", but a war none the less, that implies a strategy, battles, some for heart and minds, some for destroying and killing enemies. Even, -I will argue specifically-in humanitarian intervention, the use of armed 53 The Human security network was launched by Canada and Norway at the end of the 90s to focus on physical protection of individuals in troubled areas. Starting with Land-mines, it was broadened to included small-weapons, child soldiers, … At the same time, The second element, the Responsibility to Protect, is better known and as such demands fewer developments. In many ways, it focused on the same problem but it starts at the opposite end of the spectrum, i.e. the international law and norms among
States. By shifting the debate from the right to intervene to the duty to protect, and by underlining that this responsibility is firstly an internal matter, a wide consensus between the North and the South was achieved at the UN World Summit in September 2005 to shape the principles of The Responsibility to Protect (R2P). 57 Considering that sovereignty confers international rights but also domestic obligations, the report puts the burden of responsibility on governments whose essential and minimum duty is to protect population. In such a framework, foreign military intervention is only a last resort response to be used in extreme cases, "situations actually or potentially involving largescale killings, ethnic cleansing or other similar mass atrocity crimes". 58 In such instances, the use of force may be the only way to end these atrocities. Yet, it has to fulfil several prudential criteria: the seriousness of the threat, the primary purpose of the intervention, the proportionality of the response and the balances of consequences. It was a noticeable success to get a UN approval in 2005 of the R2P concept, especially in the context of Iraq. Europe was an unambiguous supporter of the idea. Prevention of genocide and crimes against humanity is unquestionably one of the core consensus about Europe's role in the world. Yet, the record in Darfur tells a different and rather discouraging story.
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The ESDP process itself exists because of the European failure to prevent Srebrenica.
The worst massacre since the end of WWII was the main raison d'être behind its birth, it should have been its main rationale and organizing principle to its development. As we shall see in the remainder of this contribution, this was not to be. 19 Darfur statements using phrases such as 'serious concern' or 'profound concern' a total of 53 times in a period that has seen some 200,000 slaughtered and 2.5 million displaced by government forces or government-backed militia, the Janjaweed. When something more than words is needed, the EU does not have much to boast about…" Quoted by Andrew Rettman, "Ex-commissioner attacks EU verbalism on Darfur", EU Observer, 20 March 2007. And that was a year ago, by now the number of "serious concerns" must be approaching 3 digits…
Soft Power Illusions
A security policy focused on the promotion of democracy, on the strengthening of international institutions and on the protection of human rights, is filled with moral and strategic dilemmas, complex and unsatisfactory implementations, unintended consequences and collateral damages. It demands a difficult equilibrium between ends and means, strategic interests and altruistic motives, legitimacy and efficiency. In its selection of cases for intervention, it often reveals double standards, if not manifest hypocrisy. In its implementation, it may be limited to effects rather than causes, prolonging rather than ending human rights abuses. These dilemmas are inherent to liberal internationalism itself. Yet, there are some specifically European flaws in the conception and implementation of its liberal agenda. These flaws are not superficial and they will need to be corrected in the very near future if Europe wants to retain an already largely lost ethical capital in world affairs. Essentially, European weakness is related to a recurrent confusion about the stakes at hand, to an increasing gap in the necessary means to be used and to the discrepancy between these ill defined ends and these under resourced means. In short, there is a responsibility problem and there is a commitment crisis. The two are of course linked and mutually dependent but in a more complex way than the rather straightforward relation, exposed by R. In the ESS, no geographic boundaries are defined to limit Europe's role, the emphasis on the contrary is put on global challenges rather than regional issues. The focus, as noted above, is put on global governance, state and institutions building. Three different environments must be differentiated. As with all classifications, they are more ideal types than empirical cases. In the real and complex world, they tend to blend and be part of continuum rather than separate categories. First, there are the modern but illiberal regimes that are willing and able to become post-modern. In this configuration, Europe is a model and an inspiration and its activism is quite effective. Of course, progresses are not linear, set backs are numerous and the process is expansive and fragile as the case of Bosnia currently illustrates. 62 In these cases, ESDP missions reflect a Commission's agenda, and their functions are about policing, training and the rule of law. They are a "security and defence" matter only by name. Second, there are illiberal Sates that are unwilling to change, i.e. most of the authoritarian regimes that surround Europe in the East and in the South. In these instances, alas numerous, Europe's liberalism is far less successful. As noted above, it tends to consider these regimes as part of a solution rather than part of the problem; it very rarely applies conditionality in the economic area and does not sufficiently invest in civil society. It makes perfect strategic sense not to impose democracy at the point of a gun, but stability has a humanitarian price that Europe seems all too often ready to pay. Thirdly, there are the pre-modern regimes that need to become modern. In such configuration, the environment is basically stateless where an artificial and often illegitimate government has no control over its territory and no authority over its population. these circumstances, Europe tends to offer its service and its money to help negotiate a ceasefire, to launch a political process of reconciliation, to set up the conditions for an election. The premise, as Solana once put it, is that in every conflict negotiation is possible. 64 In this endeavour as an honest and neutral broker, Europe perceives itself as ideally suited, offering a wide range of instruments to mitigate conflicts.
Not surprisingly, it is in the last two situations that mass murders, genocide and crimes against humanity tend to occur and unfortunately it is in these cases that Europe is the least effective. In these instances, an effective humanitarian policy implies qualities The situation today is far worse, -disorder and injustice-, more intricate, -human rights violations are committed by both sides-, more anarchic, -endemic violence reach pre-modern level-and wider, -aggression against refugees destabilizes neighbouring countries. In such situations, humanitarian interventions are difficult: they need to be forceful to create buffer and no fly zones where assistance can be provided; they need to involve a large number of troops to defend these safe areas and to punish the spoilers; they need to be long-lasting to allow for reconstruction and reconciliation. They could trigger an insurgency, escalate into high intensity warfare, prompt casualties to the outside force as well as among the local population. In short, they are risky and dangerous. To say the least, these characteristics are not the ones that dominate the current mindset of European leaders and public opinions. With few exceptions, Europe by and large has developed a risk-averse culture. According to polls, a significant majority consider that the use of force is counter-productive and refuse to envisage situations worth European casualties. 66 This opinion is reflected at the highest level. When asked when and where European Battle Groups would be deployed, the common answer from European officials can be summed up in few words: "where they will be successful".
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Missions are thus framed around preserving the force, not towards making a difference.
The safety and security of the tool becomes the objective of the mission, while protecting and helping local population become subsidiary. At the European level, it seems that the zero-casualty doctrine, similar to the one that was prevalent under the Clinton Administration, is now part of the ESDP implicit rules. This is the opposite of what effective humanitarian operation should look like. Moreover, this reluctance to take risks is ensured through national caveats that render collective action precarious, if not impossible. As the debate about Afghanistan demonstrates, unequal and unfair burdensharing runs the risk of destroying the solidarity and damaging the credibility of the Alliance itself. 68 What is true for NATO is true for ESDP: free-riding was a dangerous tendency in a collective defence framework; it is even more challenging in a collective security one. 10%-of the nearly 2 millions men under arms in European member States are actually usable. 75 As acknowledged by J. Solana, ", it is by no means certain that we are on track to meet all our military capability shortfalls set out in the Headline Goal 2010, or in the civilian Headline Goal 2008. 76 To put it briefly, "the sober fact remains that the European Union still has a long way to go to prove itself in the domain of hard power". Artemis 78 was a UN bridging mission, based on a quick-in, quick out expeditionary force, a short-term emergency at the service of a broader goal, i.e. strengthening the peace process in a country ravaged by nearly two decades of wars. It took place in a relatively risky environment and casualties were deemed likely by military officials. It was risky but short: this strategy was one of quick-fixing by European troops, mostly French, and devolution to African Union peacekeepers under the UN. Overall the mission was a 75 As noted above, in recent years there has been a fairly consistent level of about 70 000 European troops deployed outside the continent, whether under UN, EU, NATO, or national flags. As N. Witney argued, "This is not nothing. On the other hand, it is also less than 5% of the nearly two million men and women that we keep in uniform in Europe. The fact that some 80% of this total are simply not deployable outside their national territories tells you that the modernization of Europe's defence capabilities still has a very long way to go. 76 He added: "… And there is no mystery why. We need to spend more and to spend better. Only a handful of Member States' defence spending is over two per cent of gross domestic product (GDP). Furthermore, the United States defence budget is more than twice the aggregate of European defence spending and over 30 per cent of it goes on research and equipment. In Europe, we invest less than 20 per cent of our spending in that way. Consider research and development, and the mismatch is even worse. is always precarious to draw lessons from one case, it seems that a "counter-revolution" Second, given the wide range of the Petersberg tasks and the size of the theatre of choice, -Africa-, the strategy of "quick-in, quick-out then devolution to the UN or AU"
behind the concept has many weaknesses: projection and entry will not be that quick, Reflecting on the mission, J. Solana stated, "next time we need to make sure that we are able to get the first bit of is more achievable, but it success depends on the resolve of your enemy who may consider the issue at stake as non-negotiable. 85 The use of limited force as a signalling strategy may lead to an escalation that demands further commitments and reserve forces.
As for punishment and coercion, much depends of the nature and size of the terrain, the type of adversarial force and its tactics. If the theatre of choice is Africa, as seems to be the case for EU military operations, the least one may note is that small contingent can only fulfil a fraction of these functions for a short amount of time. The Artemis operation was successful, but today the situation in the Ituri region has again deteriorated significantly. The current risk-averse culture in Europe and the lack of deployable troops lead to a strategic and humanitarian contradiction: missions are framed according to available means and not around declared objectives.
Conclusion: A "Force" for Good?
In practice, ESDP operations reflect these flaws. From an operational point of view, several problems plagued the mission from the start. First, the force generation process was extremely difficult, due to competing engagements for the ISAF mission in Afghanistan. In particular, helicopters were in high demand with only a dozen available to that kind of sandy terrain. The original number of troops was estimated at 5000, although the UN had suggested that 12000 would be needed. After many delays, and further commitment by France, the EU settled painfully for a contingent of 3700 with a strategic reserve of 600. The Headquarter was located in Paris under General Nash, from Ireland, while the operational Headquarter was established in Abéché in Eastern Chad. The deployment furthermore was extremely slow. Due to distance, -more than 4250 km between Paris and N'Djamena-, and logistical difficulties, -Abéché can handle only one C-130s Hercules at any one time-, airlift alone took more than two months. 87 The mandates the EUFOR was "(i) To contribute to protecting civilians in danger, particularly refugees and displaced persons; (ii) To facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and the free movement of humanitarian personnel by helping to improve security in the area of operations; (iii) To contribute to protecting United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment and to ensuring the security and freedom of movement of its staff and United Nations and associated personnel". Europeans acting under the EU flag. The Irish force has been even asked to change their fatigues, which were deemed too similar to the French ones. 89 Though these efforts may make political sense in Brussels, they do not make smart strategy on the ground. First, the "Europeaness" is less real than it seems: 14 different countries may participate in the mission but France had the leading role and bears the bulk of the forces, 2100 out of 3700, on top of the already 1000 strong French military presence in the country. To distinguish between French and European flags is a subtlety that escapes nearly everyone on the ground. As a UN official put it, "It will be very complicated for the local people to manage and for humanitarians to know the difference". high. In Brussels, there were frantic discussions about possible cancellation of the EU mission and the withdrawal of the advanced units already in place. Deployment was postponed, even for a short time, when it was the most needed. This decision sent the wrong signals to the plethora of potential spoilers determined to oppose the mission.
The Al-Bashir government can only be encouraged by the mission's delay to further support the rebels in Chad. More harassment against the EUFOR, which will not be fully operational until May 2008, is thus likely as is the worsening of Chad-Sudan relations.
The EUFOR may well find itself engaged in combat operations rather than humanitarian assistance; French support will then be crucial. Focusing on neutrality in a seemingly internal Chadian dispute missed the strategic point: the real challenge is Sudan's determination to prevent an international presence on its borders. 93 The pretence of neutrality has made the mission far more difficult than it already was. Collective action is about aggregating power, not taming it. French leverage in the region was a crucial enabler to the mission, not an obstacle to it. Most importantly, if France had intervened sooner, hundreds of people may have not been killed in N'Djamena by the rebel attacks and thousands would not have been forced to flee to Cameroon. 94 To cling to a neutral posture when your potential adversary has denied it amounts to strategic shortsightedness. Even if President Sarkozy has claimed that the classic French game in Africa is over, the longstanding relationships between Paris and N'Djamena and the French support to President Déby were real. 95 That France eschewed crucial leverages of influence to please Brussels reveals the mission's strategic ambiguity. Sending troops in
Chad was doomed to rise tensions with Sudan. The "hope" in Brussels was that the Sudanese government and their rebel groups will not confront the EUFOR, yet this hope has been shattered and it may happen again sooner than later. 96 European efforts in this part of Africa deserve praise, but between the political conditions that made this operation possible and the strategic conditions that will make it successful, the gap is dangerously wide. When a decision to intervene is made, it should aim at making a difference, not at preserving Europe's 'innocence'.
It is too soon to tell how the most difficult and the longest EU mission, -the UN bridging operation is supposed to last 12 months-, will develop. But its conceptual problems and practical difficulties reveal EU's humanitarian and strategic dilemmas. The way Brussels framed the Chad mission was alas part of a European 'hubris' that confuses soldiers with Red Cross personnel. 97 This confusion has been partly translated in the Concept of Operation (ConOPS), yet the reality on the ground may rapidly force the Union to address the source of the humanitarian problem rather than its symptom. Some member states' unwillingness to choose sides coupled with a reluctance to punish spoilers have been tested before in the Balkans, it led to Srebrenica.
At a more general level, this operation demonstrates the gap between EU rhetoric and practice or, to put it in another way, illustrates the contrast between a Postmodern Europe and a very modern World. In essence, it again raises questions about the actual impact and influence of a "civilian" power that remains the pride of Europe since
François Duchêne coined the term in 1973. 98 Then as now, there was a strong belief that power politics was a feature of the past, -détente seemed successful-, that the use of force was ineffective, -the US failed in Vietnam-, and that economic power brought real influence, -Japan was then the ultimate economic success story. Less than a decade later, Hedley Bull gave a straight answer to this question. In 1982, he pleaded for the big powers of the EU to "acquire a greater element of self-sufficiency in providing for their defence", not only because of increasingly divergent interests with the United States and the persistent of the Soviet threat, but also because a more independent posture should be built "not on renunciation of force and a politics of withdrawal but rather on the attempt collectively to provide Europe the military capacity which alone could make such a posture possible". 99 More than a quarter of century later, Brussels seemed to keep the same reluctance in contemplating and exercising power. Yet, as noted above, what was true for the collective defence issue of the Cold War seems even more relevant today in a collective security and humanitarian framework.
In essence, this was the main finding behind the Solana Document. But its implementation has been more rhetorical than real. Generating, -without meeting-, expectations have dented the reputation and credibility of the EU as a liberal actor.
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Ultimately, it is less about Europe's identity than Europe's responsibility. Effective liberal internationalism is about doing good rather than being good.
